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A B S T R A C T
After the Oslo Peace Accords (1994), the West Bank, Palestine was divided into three zones as an interim
agreement for establishing a Palestinian State, where Israeli control would end on the occupied region within 5
years. These zones: Zone A, under full Palestinian control, Zone B under joint control of Israeli and Palestinian
authority and zone C which covers more than 60% of the West Bank area and which Israel has full control over
security, planning, land administration, and construction. Most of the zone is designated for Israeli military uses,
settlements and bypass roads. Palestinian communities in this zone suﬀer from signiﬁcant shortages on diﬀerent
levels, among which is urban/rural planning and development.
Planning in this zone is completely controlled by Israeli authority and has resulted in segregation and en-
claving of the Palestinian communities. In Zone C, Palestinian communities look like scattered islands, which is a
hinderance to any attempts to manage, develop or serve.
This study aims at investigating planning policies in zone C, case studies for selected communities were
chosen and examined to ﬁnd out whether there were attempts by the Palestinians to counter Israeli planning in
the assigned zone.
From the cases, it is clear that there are some Palestinian attempts to counter Israeli plans, but they failed. It is
concluded that planning in zone C is fully under control of the colonial power, no Palestinian plan proposal has
been approved.
1. Introduction
Palestine went through diﬀerent ruling regimes during the past
century: Ottoman Empire, British Mandate, Jordanian and Egyptian,
Israeli occupation and ﬁnally the Palestinian National Authority. While
under the British Mandate, eﬀorts were focused on creating a ‘National
Homeland’ for Jews in Palestine. ‘Israel’ was declared on 78% of the
land in 1948, and then in 1967 the remaining parts of Palestine: West
Bank (W.B.) and Gaza Strip were under the Israeli occupation.
As a result of the Oslo Peace Agreement in 1994, the Israeli forces
withdrew from parts of the W.B. and recognized a Palestinian right of
self-governance in some parts. The W.B. was then divided into 3 zones,1
A–C; Zone A: full Palestinian civil and security control, zone B: full
Palestinian civil control and joint Israeli-Palestinian security control,
zone C: full Israeli control over security, urban/rural planning, land
administration, and construction; most of the W.B. area was classiﬁed
as zone C (about 60% of the West Bank) (B’Tselem, 2014; B’Tselem,
2013).
The W.B., especially zone C, has remained without real urban/rural
planning since 1967. In the past few years the focus has been to do
master plans for communities in zone C. The recent initiatives were
motivated by donor countries and agencies, and were being performed
by several local planning ﬁrms. However, the upper hand in the ﬁeld of
planning in zone C is reserved for the Israeli colonial power. It is vital to
ask: are these attempts/initiatives (planning in area c) really aiming at
challenging the Israeli control and sovereignty? Is it counter planning?
Is it a new era of decolonization in urban planning in the W.B.?
2. Planning and colonial power
The relationship between planning and power is fundamental.
Physical planning can be used as a means to serve political ambitions,
and power can easily change the landscape accordingly. Classical
planning theories tend to identify the act of planning as a technical tool
used by planners to guide decision makers. Forester (1989) argued for
the signiﬁcance of looking at planning from a political perspective in
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the opening statement of his book “Planning in the Face of Power”
Forester states:
“In a world of intensely conﬂicting interests and great inequalities of
status and resources, planning in the face of power is at once a daily
necessity and constant ethical challenge” (Forester, 1989, p. 3).
Such arguments are considered valid in our communities today
considering that capitalist societies continue to create a diﬀerence be-
tween those who have power (status, money) and those who lack it (the
poor, the minorities, the marginalized (Forester, 1989). Therefore, in
order for planning to achieve its main objectives of social equity,
prosperity, and social welfare, planners are challenged to understand
the planning systems including the relations of power they are working
within. According to Sandercock (2004), in order to make planning
more ethical and inclusive, sovereignty is a crucial issue, and it is not
about participation, it is about rights. She adds that planning is an
ethical commitment to the future, in which planning has to strengthen
indigenous communities’ autonomy to manage their lands. The major
ethical considerations in planning in the face of power can be sum-
marized as: empowering indigenous communities and planners, pro-
viding them with the required skills to do the job themselves. In ad-
dition sharing information and knowledge transfer to indigenous
communities is a must.
In the colonial era, ethics in planning were absent when dealing
with natives’ rights, quality of life and basic needs. When colonies were
established, planners used the power they gained from decision makers
to oppress and isolate indigenous people in diﬀerent ways: enclave,
segregate communities and conﬁne them in remote areas in the outskirt
of the colonizers’ cities and towns. In addition planners during this era
used zoning as a tool to achieve all mentioned above goals, and ma-
nipulated with regulation to allocate low-density areas for the white,
and high density areas for the natives.
Planning and politics interact in many ways, planning in all its
forms is- and has always been- one of the most inﬂuential tools used by
politicians or colonizers to control and gain power, it also serves as the
basis for a ‘legal’ tool such as laws of private property, surveying, and
relevant regulations. Colonizers used planners to draw maps to impose
laws and regulations accordingly as a source of power (Sandercock,
2004; Carson, 2002; Coon, 1992). Power was evident in planning co-
lonial locations in which topography played a major role. Colonizers/
planners aimed at establishing their structures on top of hills to show
power and control.
Planning researchers tend to use a new term to distinguish the ac-
tual planning being applied on the ground from the utopian planning
being promoted in books and researches. This term is called “the dark
side of planning”. It is deﬁned as what planners apply on the ground
which often contradicts the common standards of democracy, eﬃciency,
and equity and planning ethics” (Flyvbjerg, 1996). Similarly Yiftachel
(1995), set the term “dark side of modernism” which addressed how
planning is used to dominate and oppress minorities (or even majorities
as in the case of South Africa). Most recent literature discusses power
and planning in the context of democracy, ethnicity, minorities, and
racial segregation. The researchers focused on how the planner has to
work as an advocate to defend these groups’ needs and objectives in the
face of dominant power. Power in this study can be deﬁned as the
power of occupation, cleansing, and changing the whole landscape to
achieve dominance, control and rule.
Çelik (1997), took a detailed look at Algiers colonial policies, these
policies were based on an understanding that architecture and urban
forms were key players in forming the life of the indigenous. Hauss-
mann’s ideas were applied here; a new spatial organization was im-
posed on the locals to control their lives, movement, culture, and way of
thinking in order to guarantee the continuation of the French colonizing
rule.
More recent example of the ramiﬁcations of power on spatial or-
ganization is the apartheid era in South Africa in the last century;
racism was a key factor in shaping the space, the idea of separate de-
velopments dominated in South Africa after 1948, policies and laws
were enacted to serve this ideology, which restricted residence of co-
lored natives to the outskirts of white urban areas and away from the
economic opportunities, and even planned for separated educational
services and other amenities. These racially based residential areas
were separated spatially with borders such as railroad lines, roads, or
open space corridors. The ruling power in South Africa justiﬁed its
racial segregation measures with the pretext of “eliminating the conﬂict
between diﬀerent races”. Eventually this yielded in creating separate
‘states’, for each of the major ethnic groups, in order to isolate the
blacks from ‘white’ South Africans (McCusker and Ramudzuli, 2007).
Fainstein and Fainstein (1994), deﬁne planning as a future-oriented,
public decision making directed toward attaining speciﬁc goals, as well
as (Levy, 2009) the understanding that real planning should take into
account the needs of the local population, and organize their space
according to their priorities. In the same context, Kay (2007), argues
that urban planning is a key player in the formation of spatial policies
that will promote integration, equality, and opportunity within a so-
ciety and its built environment, but in some cases planning measures
don’t achieve these goals due to an outer power.
Throughout history, colonialism aimed at the restructuring the
nature of the society. European colonialism for example was interested
in the development of the European societies in the colonized state,
more than it was with the development of native ethnic groups, in fact
the natives were perceived by the European colonialism as ignorant
people, who were not able to control or rule their own lives, and were
in need of help and guidance (Kay, 2007).
Many scholars in colonial planning (Yiftachel, 2009; Sandercock,
2004; Khamaisi, 2006) refer to decolonization and empowering the
indigenous people within countries of stable political context like in the
new world. They introduce how to incorporate these native groups
within the system by participation and giving them the right to share in
the planning process. However, few scholars (Thawaba, 2011; Qurt,
2013; Coon, 1992) shed light on the extreme cases of oppression and
control inﬂicted on natives by using physical planning. In this study,
decolonizing/counter planning comes in the context of the struggle
against this controlling power.
The Israeli occupation authority invited famous architects and
planners (Louis Khan, Lewis Mumford, and others) from all over the
world in 1968 – after one year of conquering Jerusalem-as was the ﬁrst
step in changing the landscape, dividing and segregating Jerusalem
(Weizman, 2007) these planners worked according to the ruling power
agenda/vision, ignoring the indigenous peoples’ rights.
This study deals with a unique context, where the colonial power
“Israel” is still conﬁscating land for the new immigrants (Jews) to settle
in the W.B. regardless of any complications it may cause to the native
people. Meanwhile the conﬂict on the land is still on-going. Moreover,
Palestinians are not allowed to build in area C without a permit, and if
they were to do so, the controlling power would immediately demolish
it, disregarding any ethical dimension. It is helpful to keep in mind that
obtaining a permit is a complicated process. In short, when using de-
colonization/counter planning in this context it means how to “counter
the colonial power actions and provide locals with legal ‘master plans’
to maintain their rights on land.”
Accordingly, theories deﬁne counter plans as schemes that are
prepared by the local community to confront the plans of mainstream
planning authority that do not serve the local inhabitants’ needs or
objectives. Here, it is worth mentioning the work of Sandercock (2004)
who addresses mechanisms leading to sovereignty and rights: using
non-indigenous planners to produce plans would empower indigenous
people and support their desire for recognition and rights, granting
indigenous institutions a legal status to facilitate their involvement in
the decision making process, using non-indigenous legal structures to
achieve recognition of rights, where ‘Western’ planners know the rule of
the game. In addition, community participation would enrich the
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process and give the needed indicators to meet the inhabitants’ needs
and objectives.
In respect to the study context, through discriminatory zoning po-
licies, and unreasonable planning system, Israel was able to restrict
Palestinian growth and set limitations on land development. They left
Palestinian communities with no real planning, leading to unfortunate
circumstances where vast surrounding areas are lacking services This
later gave Israel the pretext to conﬁscate it for “public use” and later
turn these “public use” areas into Jewish settlements (Thawaba, 2011).
In this study, it is worth mentioning that the process of planning in
areas fully controlled by the Israeli occupational power were initiated
in the past few years. In this process, planners from local ﬁrms started
to prepare master plans for deprived communities in Area C, where
services and housing are badly needed. The aim of these plans were to
counter the occupying power plans and to support Palestinian com-
munities with ‘legal’ documents to stop home demolition by the occu-
pying power in these communities.
3. Study context
Through the last century Palestine went through diﬀerent ruling
powers; each had its impact on geopolitical situation, land ownership,
and ultimately impacted planning policies directly or indirectly.
3.1. The Ottoman period (1850–1917)
Land ownership is fundamental when analyzing the planning si-
tuation in zone C. All eﬀorts of the Jewish state were pointed towards
owning more land in Palestine. Old laws stemming back to the Ottoman
period, were used to serve the purpose of land expropriation and taxes
(Abdelhamid, 2006; Bimkom, 2008; Dajani, 2005).
During the Ottoman time, land was divided into ﬁve categories
under the Ottoman Land Code of 1856, for the purpose of gradually
registering land to facilitate agricultural tax collection: ‘Mewat, ‘Miri’,
‘Matruka’, ‘Waqf ‘, and ‘Mulk’ (Waltz et al., 2010).
Mewat2 and Miri3 lands were declared as state lands by the Israeli
occupation authority to facilitate expropriation (Bimkom, 2008; Waltz
et al., 2010). In the seventies, Israel tamed the Ottoman land laws to
serve its interests.
Another key player in colonial activities in the W.B. were land
ownership and registration: many landowners did not oﬃcially register
their land during the Ottoman period to evade taxes, consequently, by
1967, 70% of the land in the West Bank wasn’t registered, henceforth
their owners failed to prove ownership (Bimkom, 2008).
3.2. The British mandatory period (1917–1948)
Starting from 1917, Palestine was under the British mandate as a
result of WWI. During this period the mandate authorities facilitated
the processes of purchasing the land and fostered Jewish immigration
and the establishment of colonies, and continued using the Ottoman
land code with some modiﬁcations to serve their own goals (Bimkom,
2008; Waltz et al., 2010). During this period, the British mandate au-
thorities performed a cadastral survey in Palestine. That was an im-
portant step in land registration and transfer which ﬁnally legalized
Jewish land ownership (Gavish and Kark, 1993).
In terms of planning, on the regional scale, in 1940s the mandatory
authorities’ prepared regional outline plans to control and manage
urban/rural development. Palestine was divided into six main districts
at the time, each one had its own outline plan. These plans are still in
use by the Israeli occupation in the W.B. Plan RJ/5 for ‘Jerusalem
district’, Plan S/15 for the ‘Samaria district’, and Plan R/6 for the
‘Lydda district’ (Bimkom, 2008).
In these plans most of the land of the W.B. was classiﬁed as “agri-
culture” (UNHABITAT, 2015). According to Coon (1992), these plans
do not serve the Palestinian needs, and provide no opportunity for
development (Fig. 1). According to UNHABITAT (2015), these plans are
very restrictive, and the Israeli Civil Administration (ICA) is still using
them to ban any development in area C. However, these plans are not
taken into consideration when dealing with Israeli colonies in the W.B.
(Bimkom, 2008).
UNHABITAT (2015) – page 24 of the IAB report says ‘From 2002 to
2010, only 176 construction permits were issued to Palestinians, but at least
15,000 residential units were built in Israeli settlements during that same
period, with or without permits.’
3.3. The Jordanian period (1948–1967)
During this era the Jordanian authorities gained custody over the
West Bank, and maintained the same planning system which was set up
by the British Mandate without modiﬁcation (Bimkom, 2008;
Abdelhamid, 2006). Throughout, this period, planning law of 1966 was
adopted delegating Jordan with full planning authority on the West
Bank (Amnesty International Website).
3.4. The israeli’ period (1967–1994)
By the year 1967 (when the W.B. was occupied) 70% of the land
couldn’t be registered as Israeli Occupation frozen land registration,
and kept its status as a Mewat or Miri land as the Ottoman code clas-
siﬁed it. This gave Israel a new excuse to reject many applications for
building permits, as the applicant couldn’t prove that he/she owned the
land on which the building would take place (B’Tselem Website, 2013;
ARIJ, 2007).
Shortly after the 1967 War, Israel started applying the policy of land
expropriation. Hundreds of thousands of dunums4 in the W.B. were
classiﬁed as ‘State Land’. Later these lands were declared ‘military
closed zones’ and ‘Nature Reserves’ and later were turned into colonies
(Waltz et al., 2010). During this period Israel issued laws, and military
orders and amended previous laws from the Ottoman and British per-
iods to facilitate conﬁscating land. In addition to that, Israel amended
the Jordanian acting Planning Law (#79), with many military orders
(MO).5 (MO 418) transferred all planning powers into the hands of an
Israeli military supreme planning committee (UN, 2015).
The mentioned military order eliminated the local and district
planning committees, and transferred the whole planning process to the
(ICA). According to Stein (2013), ICA did not approve any submitted
master plans for more than 90% of the Palestinian villages within area
C, claiming contradiction with the British mandate master plans (RJ/5
and S15). Between 2006 and 2008, the ICA approved ten master plans
for Palestinian villages located in area C, these plans were drafted by
the ICA administration without the involvement of the local residents
and depended fully on aerial photographs (Stein, 2013; Bimkom, 2008).
As mentioned earlier, according to the Oslo Accords in 1994 the
2 Owned by the state but uncultivated or uninhabited and exists within at least 2.5 km
from community outermost houses.
3 Owned by the state and designated for agricultural uses and exists in the area be-
tween the outermost houses of a community and the Mewat land.
4 One Dunnum equals to 1000 m2.
5MO#58 (1967) gives control of absentee-owned land to the Israeli military. MO#59
(1967) gives power to take over land owned by the Jordanian Government, and to ap-
propriate land from individuals or groups by declaring it “Public Land” or “State Land”
(amended by MO#364 and MO#1091). MO#291 (1968) suspended the process of land
registration. MO#321 (1969) confers the right to conﬁscate, without compensation, land
for “Public Service”. Amendments to MO#321 in 1994–1996 allow land conﬁscation for
by-pass roads that can only be used by Israelis. MO#418 (1971) amended the Jordanian
Urban Planning and Infrastructure Law of 1966, and vested the Israeli Higher Planning
Council with all powers over planning. The same order enabled the establishment of
Planning Committees within Israeli settlements in the West Bank, some with powers
autonomously to issue permits and master plans (UNHABITAT, 2015).
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W.B. land was divided into diﬀerent zones in which the C zone covered
more than 60% of the W.B. Zone C is the home of estimated 300,000
Palestinians. Israel has the exclusive control over planning and con-
struction in area C. In this zone there is 125 Israeli colonies covering
more than 63% of the area, state land and military zones cover 34%,
and the land where Palestinians are permitted to build on represents
only 0.5% (Stein, 2013; UN, 2015).
3.5. The Palestinian authority period (1994 – present)
The Palestinian authority was declared on 1994 upon the Oslo in-
terim agreement, and according to that agreement, the W.B. was to be
divided into 3 zones (area A, area B, and Area C) with diﬀerent man-
dates and sovereignties (Fig. 2).
Palestinian Ministry of Local Government was established in 1994.
The aim of this institution was to follow up, monitor and support the
planning process for communities in areas A and B. The communities
located in area C were left without any developmental plans as it is
under the control of the Israeli occupation forces.
The fragmentation of powers between two authorities in the W.B.
hinder comprehensive regional planning for the Palestinian commu-
nities. In several locations in the W.B. Palestinian communities in zones
A or B are surrounded by C zones, which means that the Palestinians
don’t have the authority to construct new roads connecting Palestinian
communities with each others. While the ICA has prepared plans for
roads, gas stations, and cellular antennas, which are dedicated mainly
for the Israeli colonies and do not serve planning needs of the
Palestinian communities (Bimkom, 2008; Waltz et al., 2010).
In 2009, a funded project by the EU and Britain in coordination with
the Palestinian Authority (PA) was launched to draft master plans for
32 Palestinian villages located in area C. The plans were submitted to
the ICA in July 2011, since then no plans have been approved (Stein,
2013; IPCC web site, 2017).
As mentioned earlier, Palestinians were obliged to get permits for
constructing any establishment outside the master plan of any village in
area C. Getting a permit is a complicated process and the chance is
minimal. During (2000–2012) 2829 Palestinian homes were demol-
ished because they were built without permits (Stein, 2013).
On the contrary, Israeli colonies in area C enjoyed all kinds of
planning, services, and infrastructure projects. Moreover, settlers were
Fig. 1. (Bimkom, 2008).
RJ5/S15 Mandatory Regional Plans Zoning.
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fully involved in planning process; colonies’ lands classiﬁcations in the
Mandate plans were changed from agriculture, natural reserve or ar-
cheological sites into land for urban development. During 2000–2010,
Palestinians got 176 construction permits, while settlers built 15,000
residential units with or without permits (B’Tselem, 2011a,b; Stein,
2013).
Planning is a complicated process in the W.B. where diﬀerent zones
have diﬀerent regulations, and the upper hand on more than 60% of the
land is reserved for the occupying power. Palestinian communities in
Area C do not have updated master plans which mean that any building
with no permit for construction is under the threat of demolition. In the
last few years, Palestinians have been working on preparing master
plans for communities in Area C. After preparing these plans they have
to be approved by the ICA, where in most cases they were rejected. This
study tries to shed light on some cases where Palestinians have tried to
counter the colonial plans.
4. Study sites
The study area is the C zone which covers approximately 3500 km2,
about 60% of the W.B. area (Fig. 3) and holds 63% of the West Bank’s
agricultural lands. The study investigated planning mechanism under
colonial power, by presenting cases for communities in area C. Three
examples were selected to illustrate the undergoing mechanism. These
selected areas represent three categories: 1) existing communities
(Fasayel), 2) communities to be transferred from their lands to new
planned areas (Nuima), 3) proposed plan for a new town (Madinat al-
qamar).
Fig. 2. Oslo agreement map 1994 (PASSIA, 2007).
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4.1. Fasayel
A Palestinian rural community (raising herds) with 1200 in-
habitants, situated in the eastern side of W.B. in the rift valley. Fasayel
has two parts: upper Fasayel and lower Fasayel, most of lower Fasayel
built-up area is in zone B according to the Oslo agreement classiﬁcation,
while the whole built up area of upper Fasayel’s is classiﬁed as zone C.
Several buildings in the locality are subjected to demolition orders. The
ICA deﬁned a blue line (master plan boundary) that excludes some
buildings. Fasayel was a “state land” land law with an agricultural land
classiﬁcation “Miri”. The village’s expansion is restricted due to many
limitations, a mountain range and Israeli colony Pezael from the north,
Israeli colony Tomer from the South, road 90(regional pass-by road)
from the east, and several Israeli military bases from the west – enclave
(Fig. 3), (IPCC, 2011; ARIJ, 2011).
Fig. 3, shows the study site of Fasayel, where it is conﬁned from the
north and south by Israeli colonies. It is clear from the ﬁgure how these
colonies are well designed, compared with Fasayel (in the middle).
These colonies are provided with ample agricultural lands and central
area for community services. The ﬁgure clearly shows the huge gap
between the conﬂicting settings: locals and colonizers.
Two proposals were prepared for Fasayel: one was conducted by the
International Peace and Cooperation center (IPCC), this one was done
by Palestinian Planners and under the supervision of Palestinian
Fig. 3. Upper and Lower Fasayel.
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Ministry of Local Government. The other one was prepared by a private
Palestinian ﬁrm (ASSIA) under the direct supervision of the ICA.
Financially the ﬁrst one was supported by donation money from the EU,
while the second one was by the ICA (occupier).
In 2013, ASSIA prepared its proposal (master plan) for the assigned
area based on the planning guidelines provided by ICA and by the
councils chair persons of both upper and lower Fasayel. The concept
suggested joining the two parts into one contiguous community, but it
was rejected, and the proposal of establishing an access road between
them was denied by the ICA. The planning team was obliged to plan
within boundaries that were given by the ICA in which the two com-
munities have to be separated. The total area to be planned (which was
given by ICA) was about 214 dunums for upper Fasayel and 121 du-
nums for lower Fasayel, these ﬁgures were not realistic according to the
statistical analyses prepared by the planning team of ASSIA.
Later, the planning team was asked by ICA to perform back calcu-
lations to set a target year for the plan, which turned out to be after two
years instead of 2030. The assigned land was divided into parcels based
on the concept of one parcel for each household another one -adjacent
parcel- for the herd, which can be used for future expansion when
needed (Fig. 4).
Fig. 4, shows the master plan prepared by ASSIA, where the two
parts of Fasayel remained separated, and the space allocated for future
expansion was minimal. The plan proposed areas for residential, com-
mercial, public, agricultural (livestock) uses, green areas and a road
network. Residential zone was divided into parcels of half a dunum
(500 m2) each. ICA insisted on keeping the two parts separated. Fas-
ayel's planning process was ﬁnalized in 2014, and was submitted to the
ICA, but approval from diﬀerent departments in the ICA are pending
until now.
During the process of preparing the plan, several meetings were
held between the planning ﬁrm representatives and the planning sec-
tion at ICA oﬃces inside one of the Israeli colonies in the W.B. (Beit Eil)
near Ramallah city. The planners worked on maps and aerial photos in
addition to meetings with the head of the community (Mokhtar) to get
his input on the plan. Meeting with the Mokhtar, was the only way to
get community perception and involvement.
The IPCC proposal: As a result of the memorandum of under-
standing between the donors, the Palestinian Ministry of planning and
the IPCC, the work on preparing a master plan for Fasayel started in
2009. Meetings were held with the community in order to get their
input in the process. In 2010, a master plan was prepared for the target
year of 2030, and was presented to the local council for ﬁnal discussion.
IPCC states that the goal of this proposal was to save the existing
houses from demolishment, and to ensure that the community had
enough space for future expansion, and to develop a road network in-
stead of the existing dirt roads and to connect the two parts of Fasayel
(Fig. 6) (IPCC, 2011).
Due to the previously mentioned restrictions (Israeli colonies from
three sides and a highway connecting Israeli colonies from the fourth
side), the only option that remained was the empty space in between
(IPCC, 2011). The IPCC proposal was denied by the ICA because it
contradicts with British Mandate plans of 1940s (S15- as mentioned
before). Finally both plans were submitted to the ICA to get the ap-
proval, after a series of negotiations with the planning section of ICA,
and both did not get the approval yet (Stein, 2013).
Fig. 5, shows the master plan prepared by IPCC, where the two
communities are connected in one fabric. The master plan provided
enough space for future expansion, and a central area for community
services.
4.2. Nuimah- Abu zhiman
Nuima-Abu Zhiman is a vacant site in Jericho governorate that was
chosen by the Israeli authorities to accommodate Palestinian Bedouins.
Meetings between the planning ﬁrm (ASSIA) and the ICA oﬃcials
revealed that the intention is to transfer Bedouin families scattered
around in area C to one place near Jericho city).
ASSIA ﬁrm was given an orthophoto with the Israeli coordinates and
a blue line6 that shows the boundaries of the area to be planned. The
allocated area was 652 dunoums (562 parcels) for the proposed upper
neighborhood called Nuimah, and 437 dunoums; (336) parcels for the
lower neighborhood called Abu Zhiman.
The plan speciﬁed the following uses: residential, public, commer-
cial, open green areas, engineering services areas (that will be utilized
for a treatment plant and water reservoir), roads, and a cemetery
(ASSIA archive, 2011). Each family is allowed to possess two parcels;
one for the livestock and one as shelter (ASSIA archive, 2011).
Fig. 6 shows the plan for a new neighborhood in the outskirt of
Jericho city. The plan does not reﬂect the social dimension and ne-
cessities (place for livestock) of the Bedouins who live on raising herds.
The form and layout of the plan looks like any neighborhood in Europe
or America, and looks similar to any nearby Israeli colony, and has
nothing in common with the adjacent city of Jericho.
The concept of establishing a new community for settling the
Palestinian Bedouins in zone C is controversial (B’Tselem, 2014). The
representative of the Israeli colony council stated that ‘they reject
bringing Bedouins from all over the rift valley to their area’, “they are
Palestinians, why settle them in our land”, and “there are vacant areas
under the Palestinian Authority control that can be repopulated, and
Israel is working on the establishment of thousands of housing units for
Palestinians in the zone C which is under full Israeli control”. They per-
ceived this kind of project as an extension of zone A on ‘governmental
Land’. The plan is not yet approved by ICA. The purpose of this plan was
to remove Bedouins from the surrounding area of Jerusalem and mainly
from a major colony to the east of Jerusalem, dismiss them for the sake
of expanding the colony of (ASSIA archive, 2011Maali Adomim.
4.3. Madinat Alqamar
It is another proposed Palestinian planned city to be established in
the Nuima area. A big part of the project is located in zone C to the
north of Jericho city, this 2500 dunum project was planned to be car-
ried out by the Palestinian Investment Fund (PIF, 2013).
Conceptual plans were drafted by a Canadian engineering ﬁrm
called Planning Alliance which provided a master plan for the area,
while the local ﬁrm (Arabtech Jardaneh) worked on the detailed master
planning studies and land use maps for 553 dunums for the ﬁrst phase
(Fig. 7).
A detailed structural plan has been prepared for Madinat Alaqamar
city, where land use and building regulations were drafted, the project
is designed to include thousands of housing units in addition to public
facilities as well as investments in the agricultural sector (PIF, 2012).
The ﬁrst phase was planned for constructing new homes for
Palestinians who are willing to buy a house and live there. The next
phase was for resettling Bedouins living on the ‘state land’ to the Jericho
district (Awad, 2013).
This plan is pending for approval from the Israeli authorities (ICA).
The council of the W.B. colonies rejected the proposal, under the pre-
text that the establishment of the city will be at the expense of land
dedicated to the colonies in the region (zone C) (Awad, 2013).
5. Analysis and discussion
Since the early 1970s, Israel has formed a centralized planning
system in the W.B. where planning of diﬀerent levels (regional, district
and local) has been fully controlled by the occupation power.
Palestinians have been denied any kind of involvement in planning
6 The blue line is used by the Israeli authority to deﬁne the boundary of the assigned
area.
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process of their own communities. On the other hand the “MO 418” has
created a separate planning system for the settlers in the W.B. where
settlers are involved in the planning process for their colonies (Bimkom,
2008). The outdated plans from the British Mandate era (S15 & RJ5) are
the major references for planning in the W.B. in which ICA has found
pretexts for denying any master plan for Palestinian villages in C zone
as well as for demolishing any construction that does not have a permit
or does not comply with the British plans.
Bimkom (2008), named the British Mandate plans for the W.B. as
“Relics of a Forgotten Era”. The British regional plans covering areas
inside Israel became irrelevant in the area declared as “Israel” in 1948
because it contradicts with the ruling power plans for development and
urban growth. On the contrary, the British plans covering the W.B. are
still in use by the occupation power as a pretext to control Palestinian
urban development, keeping in mind that these plans are not detailed
master plans, but conceptual ones.
The ﬁrst attempt to perform planning in zone C by Palestinians was
inapplicable. The regional plan for the W.B. was conducted in 1998 by
the Palestinian Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation
(MOPIC, 1998).7 This plan was based on the assumption that the Israeli
Fig. 4. Fasayel Plan Prepared by ASSIA.
7 In this plan I was one of the Palestinian team who worked to prepare it, during the
process the plan was presented in all the district of the W.B to get community feedback
and participation. The plan was needed for the Palestinians for the promised State, but
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authority would withdraw from the W.B. within ﬁve years, as stated in
the Oslo Accords in 1994. This trial was a failure as it represented the
ﬁrst attempt by the Palestinians to counter/decolonize the Israeli oc-
cupation plans. This plan was prepared by both local planners and
consultants from Norway (donor country). It covered the W.B. and Gaza
Strip as the future Palestinian State according to the Oslo Accords. The
Palestinians (with the aid of the Norwegian experts) spent over 4 years
working to produce the regional plan (1994–1998). This plan ended up
neglected because the Israeli power did not approve it, which contra-
dicted the Oslo accords, which is a demonstration of how ethics and
politics played a major role in the face of the Palestinian institutions.
Palestinian villages in zone C remained without planning for more
than 30 years. Current initiatives to prepare master plans for these
communities are supported by donor countries and agencies.
Inhabitants in these communities are suﬀering from limited space, in-
suﬃcient services, and segregation. Any attempt to build a house out-
side the ‘blue line’ is faced with demolition. As a result many in-
habitants in these villages have started to move to major cities for better
living conditions. The colonial agenda did everything in its power to
maintain a hostile and unsympathetic policy towards the Palestinians
Fig. 5. Fasayel plan prepared by IPCC.
(footnote continued)
unfortunately the Israeli colonial power did not approve it and in 2002 invaded all the
Palestinian cities and all the whole eﬀorts were lost.
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living in these communities while providing the colonies with the
needed services and developmental plans. This led the Palestinian in-
stitutions and the international community to take the initiative and
prepare master plans for some endangered communities.
In the case of Fasayel, the ﬁnal plan, which joins the two localities
upper and lower Fassayel together (Fig. 5), was denied by the Israeli
side, under the pretext of contradicting the British Mandate Plan (S15).
The concept of amalgamating small communities (upper and lower
Fasayel are less than one km apart) into one plan is a suitable planning
approach to develop urban and rural areas, to be able to provide ser-
vices more eﬃciently (Mabuchi, 2001). The ICA refused the IPCC’s
proposal of joining the two parts of Fasayel in one master plan, and
preferred keeping them separated. This demonstrates how the colonial
power strategy is to maintain segregation between indigenous com-
munities. IPCC took into consideration the local population’s needs and
desires, through workshops and consulting sessions with the local
council and representatives of the community. The Palestinian planning
team incorporated the inhabitants’ needs: ﬁeld visits, focus groups,
public hearings and surveys. As mentioned above, the team leader had
to attend meetings inside one of the colonies where the ICA oﬃces are
located. In order to attend the meetings it is necessary to apply for
permission to enter the colony, which is another indication of how the
colonial power uses unethical means to humiliate and pressure Pales-
tinian planners in order to alter the output of the plans. The plan was
Fig. 6. Nuima-Abu Zhiman proposed plan
by ASSIA (ASSIA archive).
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eventually rejected by the ICA and was commissioned to a private Pa-
lestinian ﬁrm under its supervision and according to its agenda. Most of
the inhabitants’ urgent needs, like saving their houses from demolition,
were rejected by ICA. The process of preparing the plan by ASSIA was
simply to calculate the needed area per capita for the target year. The
community perception was not incorporated into the plan; the only
means of community participation was negotiating with the community
representative (Mokhtar), and aerial photos were used instead of ﬁeld
visits. The plan was rejected because the necessary area exceeded what
the commissioner at ICA had in mind. As a compromise by the ICA they
changed the target year to be 2014 instead of 2030, resulted in adding a
small area to the plan. The process here shows how the colonial power
uses diﬀerent means (no clear criteria) in order to impose its agenda of
delineation and segregation.
According to B’Tselem8 most of the colonial military outposts were
built on private Palestinian lands, or state land, although it contradicts
with British Mandate plans. Many colonies started as an outpost which
was erected by one settler or more, and it later developed into a colony
like ‘Migron’ which was established as a place for ‘an antenna’ for an
Israeli cell phone company (Weizman, 2007).
The location of Nuima-Abu Zhiman was proposed by the ICA, on a
Fig. 7. Nuima and Madinat Alaqamar
(http://www.ajpal.com/project/madenat-
al-qamar).
8 Israeli NGO working on the Israeli violations in the West Bank.
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vacant land near Jericho city, in zone C. This site was selected to re-
locate the Bedouins living around Jerusalem near ‘Maale Adumim’
colony, and other Bedouin communities in the Rift Valley. The pro-
posed site is surrounded by Israeli ﬁring zones, colonies and a military
checkpoint. This deprives the potential Bedouin residents from grazing
pastures for their cattle, considering Bedouins make their living mainly
from shepherding. The main purpose of transferring these Bedouins to
Jericho area is to get more empty lands for the sake of Maale Adumim
expansion and development (B’Tselem, 2014; Stein, 2013).
Even though, the proposal was conducted by a Palestinian ﬁrm
(ASSIA) in zone C, it can’t be considered a counter act against land
conﬁscation. First of all the location of the community was not chosen
based on any logical criteria and was assigned by the ICA (colonial
power). The whole project is for the beneﬁt of the Israeli colonial power
resettle the Bedouins from their home. The targeted inhabitants did not
participate in the planning process, their needs were not assessed, and
on top of that Bedouins were not willing to leave their environment.
This approach of planning contradicted the ethics of planning for
people Carrillo, 2009). Furthermore, the international law; Fourth
Geneva Convention states that “the Occupying Power shall not deport or
transfer parts of its own civilian population from the territory it occupies”,
and Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court classiﬁes the acts
of deportation or forcible transfer of population as ‘crime against
humanity’ and a ‘war crime’ (ICC-International Criminal Court, 2002).
The cases discussed in this study can be divided into two categories:
(i) Plans prepared by Palestinian ﬁrms following a professional process
where community’s’ needs and public participation were incorporated.
In this kind of plan, the Palestinian agenda was the guide – to serve the
deprived communities- in order to provide indigenous communities
with a ‘statutory’ document to stop house demolishing. The case of IPCC
in Fasayel represents a good example and it is considered a counter
planning model in the face of colonial planning. On the regional scale
the work of the Ministry of planning staﬀ jointly with Norwegian ex-
perts prepared the regional plan for the W.B. and Gaza, representing a
counter planning model on a bigger scale where the Palestinian agenda
was the guide, and the aim was to plan for the promised Palestinian
State (acccording to the Oslo Accords).
(ii) Plans prepared by either Israeli planners or Palestinian ﬁrms
under Israeli supervision with money allocated by the Israeli occupying
power. In these kinds of plans, the blue line was given by the occupying
power and the agenda was to serve the Israeli authority’s intentions in
conﬁning and segregating Palestinian communities. The outline plans
for Palestinian communities that were prepared by the ICA or a hired
consultant were conducted according to their rules: without any in-
volvement from residents of the village (Bimkom, 2008). The only stage
Palestinians were allowed to participate in, during the planning pro-
cess, is the stage of ‘objections’, and that happens when the plan is
drafted, and then ICA allows Palestinians to submit their objections on
the plan, and in most cases these objections are discarded (Bimkom,
2008). The cases of ASSIA ﬁrm represent this kind of planning, where
counter planning is missing and the community’s needs are absent.
The power of the colonizer in planning is clear: The ‘blue line’ is
mainly to draw the limits of delineation and not the boundary of future
expansion. In addition, consultants have to go to the ICA oﬃce, which
is inside one of the colonies in the W.B. land “Beit Eil” near Ramallah,
to discuss the drafts with the oﬃcers (Architects and military com-
manders). All the eﬀorts to plan communities in area C end up denied/
pending from the occupying power.
It is clear that the study context is unique, and it is not similar to
other cases in the New World, where newcomers are living side by side
with the indigenous people in one country. The indigenous people’s
right is mainly concerned with social and economic dimension. The
cases here in the W.B. are diﬀerent and exceptional: the occupation
forces are concerned with taking more lands to establish new colonies
for new Jewish immigrants. It is a true cleansing process where
Palestinians have no right to plan or defend their existence. Israeli
colonies in the W.B. are illegal by international law. The peace treaty
signed by both sides (Palestinians and Israelis – Oslo accords in 1994)
calls for creating a Palestinian State in the W.B. and Gaza strip, but the
Israeli side does not comply to the international agreement, and the
conﬂict here is between colonial power who rule every aspect of life
and indigenous people’s right of existence.
Palestinians have not been allowed to prepare their own plans or
participate in the planning process since 1967, and this illustrates the
true meaning of occupation and the domination of the indigenous
people’s lives. Here, colonial power uses planning to control more land
and people regardless of the ethics of conventional planning. Also, co-
lonial power disregards the main principles of classical planning the-
ories. Yiftachel (2009), describe such a process by saying: “urban
planning becomes a potentially powerful governing tool with which to shape
people’s lives and subjectivities”. He added, in order to face such an ap-
proach, planners should work and support the marginalized groups
(indigenous) in diﬀerent ways to oppose the colonization power, and it
also requires the development of ‘insurgent planning’ as stated by
Holston (2007).
6. Conclusion
The division of the West Bank into areas A B and C were created as a
result of negotiations in the Oslo Agreement, to facilitate the Israeli
forces withdrawal from the W.B. in order to announce the Palestinian
State. This means that these divisions were temporary to facilitate an
incremental transfer of control on the whole W.B. to the Palestinian
Authority. 60% of the W.B. has been classiﬁed as Area C, where Israel
prevented any kind of development. ICA refused to approve any master
plan for any village in zone C and any ‘illegal’ establishment remains
under the threat of demolition.
The cases presented in this study show that the Palestinians tried
their best to prepare physical plans for local communities in zone C to
meet the inhabitants’ needs for expansion and development. The me-
chanism used was faced brutally with rejection and denial by the co-
lonial power. The conﬂict is clear between two unequal sides: the in-
digenous people, who have the right to live on their lands with full
sovereignty, and the occupation power which has control and au-
thority.
All planning attempts by Palestinians have either been rejected or
are pending and the ICA’s given response has routinely been: ‘contra-
diction with the outdated British Mandate regional plans’ (Bimkom,
2008). Several reports (UNHABITAT, 2015) and studies have been
conducted to investigate planning practice in area C, all agreed on the
same point: ‘it is under full control by the occupying power, it is co-
lonial action leading to apartheid’. Where International Law plainly
says that the W.B. is an occupied land and the Israeli settlements are
illegal in the area. This is another kind of war against the inhabitants in
the study area ‘cold war’ or we might call it ‘soft War’ or ‘invisible War’.
Ultimately, planning in the W.B. area is still under all these restrictions
made by the colonial power driven by military orders issued by ICA
oﬃcials, supported by the pieces of antiques ‘British Mandate regional
plans’. The cases in this study presented a clear interconnection be-
tween oppressive power and the absence of rights, where power can
easily eliminate colonized people’s rights, regardless of any ethics and
discarding international laws.
The current campaign of planning in zone C represents a counter
planning process to face the occupying power attempts to expand their
colonial project all over the W.B. Countering the colonial power will be
achieved by providing alternative plans that meet the locals’ needs and
fulﬁll their aspirations by saving the existing constructions from de-
molition and providing the needed space for future expansion. In order
to achieve this, the issue must be brought to light and presented in front
of the international.
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